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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Dean Rea filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania 
alleging that Federated Investors violated 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) 
when it refused to hire Rea because he had previously 
declared bankruptcy.  The District Court granted Federated‟s 
motion under Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P., to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim, holding, in accordance with the 
majority of other courts to have addressed the issue, that § 
525(b) does not create a cause of action against private 
employers who engage in discriminatory hiring.  We will 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The facts are not in dispute.  Rea filed for bankruptcy 
in 2002 and his debts were discharged in 2003.  In 2009, Rea 
applied for employment with Federated through the 
placement firm Infinity Tech Services.  Although it appeared 
after Federated interviewed him that Rea would be hired by 
Federated, Infinity later informed Rea that Federated had 
refused to hire him because of his bankruptcy.   
 
Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits 
discrimination against an individual solely because he or she 
is or has been a debtor or bankrupt, provides: 
 
(a) . . . [A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, 
suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, 
franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a 
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grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant 
against, deny employment to, terminate the 
employment of, or discriminate with respect to 
employment against, a person that is or has been a 
debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under 
the Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom 
such bankrupt or debtor has been associated, solely 
because such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a 
debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the 
Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the 
commencement of the case under this title, or during 
the case but before the debtor is granted or denied a 
discharge, or has not paid a debt that is dischargeable 
in the case under this title or that was discharged under 
the Bankruptcy Act. 
 
(b) No private employer may terminate the 
employment of, or discriminate with respect to 
employment against, an individual who is or has been 
a debtor under this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the 
Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with such 
debtor or bankrupt, solely because such debtor or 
bankrupt-- 
 
(1) is or has been a debtor under this title or a 
debtor or bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act;  
 
(2) has been insolvent before the 
commencement of a case under this title or 
during the case but before the grant or denial of 
a discharge; or  
 
(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a 
case under this title or that was discharged 
under the Bankruptcy Act.  
 
Federated moved to dismiss Rea‟s action, arguing that 
§ 525(b) does not prohibit a private employer from refusing 
to hire an individual because that individual has claimed 
bankruptcy.  Rea asserted that the Court was required to read 
§ 525(b) broadly to effect its remedial purpose, and that under 
that expansive reading, § 525(b) does include such a 
proscription.   
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Noting that there was a lack of binding precedent to 
inform its determination, the District Court employed basic 
principles of statutory construction to reach its conclusion.  
As the Supreme Court stated in Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16, 23 (1983), “[w]here Congress includes particular 
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion.”  (internal quotations and brackets 
omitted). 
 
Applying this precept, the District Court found no 
merit in “[Rea]‟s suggestion that the phrase „discriminate 
with respect to employment‟ found in both subsections 525(a) 
and (b) be read to encompass the phrase „deny employment 
to,‟ found only in subsection 525(a).”  Rea v. Federated 
Investors, 431 B.R. 18, 23 (W.D. Pa. 2010).  It thus 
“decline[d] to impose the prohibition set forth in [§] 525(a) 
upon [§] 525(b), because Congress clearly opted to exclude 
it.”  Id.  The Court agreed with Federated that “[Rea] lack[ed] 
a statutorily cognizable cause of action under 11 U.S.C. § 
525(b) against [Federated], a private employer, for denying 
[Rea] employment when [Rea] readily admits to having filed 
for bankruptcy and was declared to have been bankrupt.”  Id.  
It granted Federated‟s motion to dismiss accordingly.  Rea 
appeals.
1
 
 
II. 
 
 Rea contends that the District Court erred as a matter 
of law.  We conduct a plenary review of the District Court‟s 
order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  
Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 190 
(3d Cir. 2009).  We accept all factual allegations as true, 
construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to Rea, and 
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 
Complaint, Rea may be entitled to relief.  See id. 
 
                                              
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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 Relying on Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), Rea asserts that the plain meaning of the 
prohibition in § 525(b) against “discrimination with respect to 
employment” is broad enough to encompass discrimination in 
the denial of employment.  In Leary, the District Court was 
not persuaded by the argument that Congress purposefully 
omitted from § 525(b) the phrase “deny employment to,” 
which is contained in § 525(a), instead attributing the 
difference to a “scrivener [who] was more verbose in writing 
§ 525(a).”  Id.  In reasoning that “[t]he evil being legislated 
against is no different when an employer fires a debtor simply 
for seeking refuge in bankruptcy, as contrasted with refusing 
to hire a person who does so,” the Court concluded that the 
plain meaning of “discrimination with respect to 
employment” in § 525(b) and the “fresh start” policy 
underlying the provision supported the construction that Rea 
now urges us to adopt.  Id. 
 
 We find Rea‟s reliance on Leary unavailing.  Leary 
appears to be the only court to conclude that § 525(b) 
prohibits private employers from engaging in discriminatory 
hiring, contrary to overwhelming authority otherwise.  See, 
e.g., Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc., 431 B.R. 894 (S.D. Tex. 
2010); Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51 (M.D. 
Fla. 2009); In re Stinson, 285 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 
2002); Fiorani v. Caci, 192 B.R. 401 (E.D. Va. 1996); 
Pastore v. Medford Sav. Bank, 186 B.R. 553 (D. Mass. 1995); 
In re Madison Madison Int’l of Ill., 77 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wis. 1987); see also In re Hopkins, 81 B.R. 491 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ark. 1987) (§ 525(b) proscribes discriminatory conduct 
after offer of full-time employment extended to a part-time 
employee).  The decision has been widely criticized because 
it elevates the assumption that a scrivener erred over the plain 
meaning of the statute.  See, e.g., Burnett, 431 B.R. at 900-01.   
 
 Where the language of the statute is plain, “the sole 
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”  
W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 99 (1991) 
(internal quotations omitted).  Although § 525(b) was enacted 
years after § 525(a), its language regarding employment 
discrimination is nearly identical to that used in § 525(a) and 
Congress chose to place the two subsections adjacent to each 
other in the Bankruptcy Code.  It is abundantly clear that 
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Congress modeled § 525(b) off of § 525(a) and that any 
differences between the two are a result of Congress acting 
intentionally and purposefully.  As the Supreme Court stated 
in Russello, “[w]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusive or 
exclusion.”  464 U.S. at 23 (internal quotations and brackets 
omitted). 
 
 Section 525(a) provides that the Government may not 
“deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or 
discriminate with respect to employment against” any person 
that has been bankrupt.  (emphasis added).  In § 525(b), on 
the other hand, Congress omitted the language prohibiting a 
private employer from “deny[ing] employment to” a person 
that has been bankrupt.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Russello, “[w]e refrain from concluding here that the differing 
language in the two subsections has the same meaning in 
each.  We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a 
simple mistake in draftsmanship.”  464 U.S. at 23. 
 
We will not contravene congressional intent by 
implying statutory language that Congress omitted.  In re 
Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“The role of the courts in interpreting a statute is 
to give effect to Congress‟s intent.”) (internal quotations 
omitted).  Nor will we interpret statutory language in a way 
that would render any part thereof superfluous.  United States 
v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2005).  The District 
Court properly declined Rea‟s request to read the phrase 
“discrimination with respect to employment” in § 525(b) as 
broad enough to encompass discrimination in the denial of 
employment.  Congress did not so provide.  Neither will we. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 
